[Book Review] Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber by Plassart, Anna
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
[Book Review] Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber
Journal Item
How to cite:
Plassart, Anna (2021). [Book Review] Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber. European Journal of Political
Theory (Early Access).
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2020 Anna Plassart
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1177/1474885120937574
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk




The Open University, UK
William Selinger, Parliamentarism: From Burke to Weber, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
2019; 246 pp.: ISBN 978-1-108-4564-7, £75 (hardback)
Abstract
William Selinger’s Parliamentarism: from Burke to Weber aims to redefine our understand-
ing of what it means to live in a free state. It displaces the concept of “democracy” as a
(supposedly) central concern for a range of canonical nineteenth-century authors, and
demonstrates that another concept, that of “parliamentarism”, stood at the core of
many European liberal writers’ quest for liberty. Selinger shows that Montesquieu’s
description of a “balanced” English constitution protected by a system of checks and
balances was challenged by a number of contemporary observers of British politics
(including Jean-Louis de Lolme and Edmund Burke), who elaborated rival accounts
emphasizing instead the dominant position of a powerful representative assembly
which mirrored the nation it represented. The resulting doctrine of “parliamentarism”,
the book demonstrates through a series of case studies that include Tocqueville, Mill
and Weber, subsequently became the “dominant paradigm of a free state across
Europe” (p. 9) in the nineteenth century.
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William Selinger’s first book sets itself an ambitious task: to redefine our under-
standing of what it means to live in a free state. The result is an illuminating
rediscovery of an entire political tradition, which powerfully illustrates how con-
textual intellectual history can help challenge modern assumptions and make the
past appear ‘strange and unfamiliar all over again’ (p. 4). Selinger does so by
displacing the concept of ‘democracy’ as a (supposedly) central concern for a
range of canonical 19th-century authors, and demonstrating that another concept,
that of ‘parliamentarism’, stood at the core of many European liberal writers’
quest for liberty.
The story starts with Montesquieu, here dethroned as the founding father of
liberal constitutionalism in Europe. Far from providing a core inspiration for
post-revolutionary liberal thought, Selinger argues, Montesquieu’s classic account
of the English constitution was already being challenged in the 18th century.
Dissatisfied with his description of a ‘balanced’ English constitution protected
by a system of checks and balances, a number of contemporary observers of
British politics (including Jean-Louis de Lolme and Edmund Burke) elaborated
rival accounts, emphasizing instead the dominant position of a powerful represen-
tative assembly which mirrored the nation it represented. The resulting doctrine of
‘parliamentarism’, the book demonstrates, was reworked by de Sta€el and Constant
in the wake of the French Revolution, and subsequently became the ‘dominant
paradigm of a free state across Europe’ (p. 9) in the 19th century. From the 1840s
onward, much of the discussion focused on whether parliamentarism could accom-
modate democratic principles and the emergence of mass democratic participation,
with case studies here centred on Tocqueville, Mill and Weber.
Selinger points out that intellectual historians (the author of this review includ-
ed) have often tended to build their narratives of 19th-century political thought
through the prism of democracy: from this perspective, it is the sudden burst of
democratic revolutions in the late 18th century that requires explaining, followed
by renewed distrust in democratic ideas in the wake of the French Revolution, and
the subsequent ebb and flow of democratic ideas and institutions in the 19th and
20th centuries. He is of course correct to remind his readers that Enlightenment
writers only displayed limited interest in democracy as such; rather, it was the
wider question of liberty that formed the primary focus of their enquiries: what
societal and political conditions would allow men (and to some extent women) to
live free lives. This was usually understood to be only possible within the structure
of a ‘free state’, and the question then became that of the institutions which could
enable freedom to flourish in society. Democracy was only one of many possible
answers to this question. Parliamentarism was another, and one which, Selinger
suggests, appeared much more plausible to not only Enlightenment but also many
19th-century political writers.
What, then, is ‘parliamentarism’? In Selinger’s account, it is not simply equated
to representative government in its many guises. It is, rather, a specific doctrine,
which first emerged as a descriptive account of post-1688 British politics before
being theorized as a set of principles in the wake of the French Revolution.
2 European Journal of Political Theory 0(0)
Selinger identifies four distinct features: a powerful elected legislative assembly;
ministers who were part of the elected legislature and could not remain in power
without parliamentary support; a constitutional monarch; and a system of com-
peting political parties. This structure emphasized legislative deliberation as the
driving force behind political decisions, thereby enabling the nation to ‘truly be
governed by a representative assembly’ (p. 3). Both 18th-century observers of the
English constitution and 19th-century constitutional theorists acknowledged that
this species of parliamentary government was not without its dangers. The role of
the monarch, and the extent of royal powers, including the practice of patronage,
were especially contentious. Parliamentary regimes were also widely acknowledged
to be susceptible to corruption. Much of the book is therefore concerned with
tracing the various remedies which were proposed by the advocates of parliamen-
tarism to ensure stability and avoid usurpation – whether by the monarch, or by
parliament itself.
From the outset, Selinger situates the tradition of parliamentarism in relation to
two other, much more widely studied concepts: liberalism and democracy. But this
is largely in order to evacuate them. Parliamentarism, he contends, must be studied
on its own terms, because it is the main prism through which many Enlightenment
and liberal writers thought about politics. Parliamentarism, liberalism and democ-
racy are described as overlapping sets forming a Venn diagram: certainly it was
possible to be at once a parliamentarian, a liberal and a democrat, and many 19th-
century liberals were also proponents of parliamentarism. But the combination
was far from inevitable. Jean-Louis de Lolme, for instance, was writing 40 years
before the word ‘liberal’ was first used in its modern sense, and was no advocate
for radical democracy.
This is not to say that the book has nothing to say about either liberalism or
democracy – quite the opposite. Parliamentarism, Selinger demonstrates, should be
understood as a direct ancestor of liberalism. The relationship between parliamen-
tarism and democratic thought is perhaps less direct: John Stuart Mill’s attempts
to reconcile the two notions provides a striking case study, but he is the exception
rather than the rule. Parliamentarism did share important premises with democ-
racy, most notably the notion of a representative assembly, but it did not imply
(although it was certainly compatible with) universal suffrage or popular sover-
eignty. In practice, most of the theorists of parliamentarism discussed by Selinger
preferred the sort of restricted suffrage practised in Britain’s own parliamentary
regime.
One particular strength of Selinger’s argument is its anchoring in institutional
practices. While very much a work of intellectual history, and primarily focused on
canonical authors such as Constant, Tocqueville and Mill, the book situates these
authors not only within intellectual traditions and pan-European debates, but also
within their professional practice as parliamentarians. Moreover, the foundation
for the debates outlined in the volume is to be found in the careful contemporary
observations of the practical workings of the English constitution after 1688: out-
lining these 18th-century accounts takes up much of Chapter 1. Parliamentarism,
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Selinger shows, did not originate as a work of theory; rather, it emerged from the
observation and analysis of an existing set of institutions and practices in 18th-
century England. The English constitution was both profoundly innovative and
widely celebrated for being conducive to liberty. Its main feature, in the view of
contemporary observers, was the existence of a deliberative assembly allowing for
genuine (if limited) representation and popular involvement. But its fundamental
novelty lay in its ability to supervise the monarch through oversight of the royal
finances. This was why many did not believe that the English constitution was, in
fact, balanced: it was the House of Commons which should in fact be considered
the dominant power.
While the opening chapter calls in a wide variety of writers (including Hume,
Blackstone and Bolingbroke), both well-known and less so, the analysis largely
focuses on the Swiss writer Jean-Louis de Lolme, and should establish him in his
rightful place as a major theorist of constitutional thought. Selinger inscribes his
argument in the line of several recent important studies (notably by Iain
McDaniel) seeking to reframe our understanding of de Lolme not as a follower
of Montesquieu but rather as an insightful critic of the Spirit of the Laws. In his
reading, de Lolme’s Constitution of England (1771) is reframed as a key text for the
elaboration of an account which recognized and celebrated the House of
Commons’ constitutional dominance. The decisive break with Montesquieu’s
theory of a balanced constitution, Selinger suggests, was arguing that ‘liberty
required the House of Commons to be predominant over the Crown’ (p. 41).
The risk of legislative usurpation, which would see a popular member of the
House of Commons seize power, was circumscribed by the very institution of
monarchy: the existence of a hereditary monarch put a symbolic limit to the ambi-
tion of representatives. The English government, de Lolme concluded, compared
favourably with classical republics: it was protected against usurpation and the
abuse of executive power, while still allowing for popular involvement in law-
making, through the process of parliamentary deliberation, whose presentation
to the public in the press constituted a form of political education and public
deliberation.
Some readers may disagree with Selinger’s reading of Montesquieu as a propo-
nent of a ‘balanced’ English constitution composed of three separate powers hold-
ing each other in equilibrium. Arguably, Montesquieu himself did not believe that
the English constitution was in fact balanced – as suggested by his claim that
Britain was a republic ‘in hiding’ (Laws V. 19) – nor did he believe that it
should be. This would in turn raise questions about the extent to which de
Lolme and Burke ‘broke’ with Montesquieu – although there certainly were mean-
ingful differences there, such as de Lolme’s view that the English constitution was
more stable and durable than Montesquieu had feared. While some of
Montesquieu’s readers may indeed have interpreted him as describing and endors-
ing a ‘balanced’ English constitution, it was also possible to read the text as shoring
up Whig constitutional theory, i.e. as endorsing a dominant role for the House of
Commons. Indeed, as highlighted by Selinger, de Lolme was not alone in seeing
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the English constitution as ‘imbalanced’ in favour of the House of Commons:
many contemporary observers agreed, including David Hume, Adam Smith and
most 18th-century Scottish Whigs. Yet there is little textual evidence, to this
reviewer’s knowledge, that the latter saw themselves as breaking with
Montesquieu on this point. Quite possibly they interpreted Spirit of the Laws –
a foundational text for writers such as Smith, Millar and Ferguson – as being
entirely compatible with their constitutional Whiggism.
This caveat does not cast fundamental doubt on the soundness of Selinger’s
thesis, but it may shift its balance ever so slightly: arguably, the disagreement with
Montesquieu was not primarily (or not always) about whether the House of
Commons was the dominant constitutional power, but rather about the existing
practices that would safeguard British liberty. Whether or not he favoured consti-
tutional dominance for the legislative power, Montesquieu believed English poli-
tics to be deeply corrupt, and identified a clear risk that the balance would
eventually tilt too far in Parliament’s direction, ending in usurpation by charis-
matic and ambitious leaders. His late 18th-century readers identified the same risk
but, as demonstrated by Selinger, their intimate knowledge of the workings of the
English constitution led them to identify a number of features that would, they
believed, ensure its stability.
In de Lolme’s wake, a number of writers seized upon his account of an imbal-
anced constitution, while adding another element to his analysis of the English
parliamentary system: the regular presence of Crown ministers in Parliament, it
was widely argued, improved the quality of debates as well as prevented represen-
tatives from over-reaching their authority. Here Selinger pays particular attention
to the ministry of Robert Walpole, which crystallized the role of ministerial lead-
ership in parliament as a fundamental element of the English political system. He
shows how the practice of patronage was not only criticized for undermining the
House of Commons’ capacity to control the Crown, and corrupting the political
system, but also – and this is what has been less noticed – praised by Walpole and
his followers for maintaining harmony between the executive and legislative
powers, and for being the only tool at the Crown’s disposal for ensuring that
ministers could play a leading role in Parliament. In this analysis, patronage was
therefore essential to the practice of parliamentary government: this was a dis-
agreement with long ramifications into the 19th century, as the following chapters
make clear.
Having established the central tenets of ‘parliamentarism’ as a set of practices
widely believed to ensure the stability and harmony of England’s imbalanced con-
stitution, in Chapter 2 the book proceeds to reinterpret Burke’s political ideas in
this new light. Selinger shows that Burke’s conception of parliamentary govern-
ment was similar to that of de Lolme, and that his positive assessment of Britain’s
constitutional monarchy, tempered in turns by the threat of patronage and cor-
ruption, remained a constant feature in his political thinking, from his Thoughts on
the Cause of the Present Discontents in 1770 all the way to his well-known com-
mentary on the French Revolution. Selinger is persuasive in his argument that
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representative assemblies – whether British or French – stood at the centre of
Burke’s political thinking as well as his professional practice.
If Burke is a central figure in this story, it is perhaps not because his conception
of parliamentary government stood out among his contemporaries – it was hardly
controversial for British Whigs to claim constitutional supremacy for the House of
Commons, as Selinger’s analysis of Smith (among others) makes clear. However,
when it came to Sottish Whigs such as Smith, this claim was descriptive rather than
normative, and they could certainly conceive of alternative constitutional arrange-
ments that would equally allow for the development of liberty – in this they were
indebted to Montesquieu’s view that the independence of the judiciary mattered
above all else. The reason Burke stood apart from these discourses was his pre-
scriptive, and highly contentious, application of the doctrine in the context of the
French Revolution. In Selinger’s reading, Burke’s 1790 Reflections on the
Revolution in France becomes an indictment of the French National Assembly –
not only an illegitimate Assembly, but more importantly a dangerously powerful
executive body that was neither balanced by the executive nor a truly deliberative
body. Unavoidably, this would lead to unsustainable tensions between the legis-
lative and executive powers, and to the creation of a republic. In this reading, the
failures of the Constitution of 1791 are therefore identified by Burke – and,
Selinger’s argument goes, by Burke’s 19th-century readers – as ‘setting in
motion the chain of events that would lead to the Terror’ (p. 82), and therefore
as further confirmation of the many virtues of parliamentarism. Here Selinger
provides new depth and context for de Lolme’s influence on the early French
revolutionary debate, bolstering the view that French proponents of an English-
style constitutional monarchy based their proposals on de Lolme’s account rather
than Montesquieu’s.
It is of course debatable whether the Terror should be attributed, either directly
or indirectly, to the constitutional reforms of 1791 and 1792. Regardless, Selinger
makes a compelling case that this was the reading of a number of French, Swiss
and British commentators in the aftermath of the French Revolution. In this
analysis, the series of constitutional experiments that characterized early 1790s
France all sought to establish forms of parliamentary rule, but emphatically not
‘parliamentarism’ as it was understood by de Lolme or Burke: the revolutionaries
favoured a powerful representative assembly, but within a system that did not
involve the presence of ministers in the assembly, monarchical influence or political
parties. It is only following Napoleon’s fall in 1814 that France adopted a consti-
tution self-consciously modelled on that of England. It was in this period that the
term ‘parliamentary government’ first appeared in France, and Selinger makes the
point that the authors who defended English-style parliamentary practices –
including Benjamin Constant, Simonde de Sismondi, François Guizot, Destutt
de Tracy, Germaine de Sta€el and Chateaubriand – were now consciously defending
a distinct, universally applicable system of government. The emergence of parlia-
mentary government as a viable alternative for modern states, Chapter 2 con-
cludes, was forged through these French and Swiss writers’ analysis of
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revolutionary events and engagement with post-revolutionary French constitution-
al debates.
The bedrock of Selinger’s case is to be found in Chapters 3 and 4, which offer a
number of fresh insights into French post-revolutionary constitutional thought,
through a series of richly-evidenced case studies. Chapter 3 focuses on the ‘liberal
parliamentary turn’ of the 1790s. The theories of parliamentarism formulated by
Necker, de Sta€el and Constant emerged, Selinger argues, from their critique of the
ill-fated Constitution of 1791, which had attempted to combine the powerful inde-
pendent executive favoured by the monarchist Jean-Joseph Mounier with Sieyes’s
strict separation of the executive and legislative function. Neither did they believe
that Condorcet’s attempt to radically increase popular participation, as enshrined
in the Girondon constitution of 1793, was a satisfactory alternative. Rather, they
turned to the theories of English constitutionalism presented by Burke and (espe-
cially) de Lolme, in order to propose parliamentarism as an answer to France’s
constitutional turmoil.
In some ways, this is a familiar story: the 1790s were rife with discussions about
French constitutional reform and how the turn from reform to Terror could have
been avoided. But told by Selinger, the familiar story becomes unfamiliar again:
from the perspective of his protagonists, the lesson to be learned from the French
Revolution was not (or not directly, or not only) the reaffirmation of the old belief
that democratic institutions were inherently unstable and dangerous, but rather
that an all-powerful legislative power could never be trusted not to usurp liberty.
They turned to the principles of English parliamentarism to ensure that the legis-
lative would be constitutionally restrained, while still fulfilling its mission to delib-
erate and govern.
This shift is traced back to the writings of Jacques Necker, and of his daughter
Germaine de Sta€el. Both reflected on the means to achieve the benefits of a rep-
resentative assembly, while avoiding the pitfalls revealed by the events of 1792 and
1793. Necker’s diagnosis was directly inspired by de Lolme: an effective and stable
representative system required both the presence of ministers in Parliament and the
existence of a hereditary monarch who would lend majesty and dignity to parlia-
mentary rule. De Sta€el emerges as a particularly important figure in this story,
through her original and influential vision for a parliamentary republic in which
public opinion would act as the final arbiter in parliamentary competition.
It is Benjamin Constant, however, who is identified in Chapter 4 as formulating
the account of parliamentary government that became the ‘paradigm’ for 19th-
century conceptions of a liberal state. His constitutional theory, Selinger shows,
was developed in the 1790s and early 1800s, when he was still a republican.
Constant’s original contribution was to argue for a constitutional monarch who
was not involved in political decisions, while demonstrating that the English par-
liamentary model did not require widespread patronage to function. Following de
Sta€el, he instead put his faith in public opinion, free press and public deliberations
conducted by a powerful legislature. In Constant’s reworking of Montesquieu, the
executive became significantly constrained constitutionally, holding neither
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executive nor legislative responsibilities: the monarch would serve as a ‘neutral
power’ whose function (through the power of dissolution) was to prevent the
other (active) powers from either becoming gridlocked or combining to usurp
power.
One particularly welcome feature of Selinger’s re-interpretation of post-
revolutionary constitutional thought is its focus on two ‘remarkably intertwined’
(p. 84) groups of writers: Constant and de Sta€el’s ‘Coppet circle’, and the
‘Edinburgh Whigs’ associated with Dugald Stewart and the Edinburgh Review.
Both groups have been the object of extensive research, but the connections
(both personal and intellectual) between their respective members remain under-
appreciated, and Selinger’s analysis usefully uncovers additional strands of shared
intellectual DNA between the two. Some of these areas of shared interest between
the Coppet circle and the Edinburgh Whigs, such as the latter’s intense interest in
the role of ‘public opinion’ in modern politics, may even have deserved to be
highlighted in further detail.
Regardless, Selinger presents more than enough evidence to make his case a
convincing one. Namely, the parliamentary theories developed in the Coppet circle
shared many striking similarities with the political views publicized by the
‘Edinburgh Whigs’. Both groups advocated ‘a powerful assembly that represented
the people and controlled the executive; a constitutional monarch who maintained
his position in the state through dignity rather than prerogatives; ministers who
served in Parliament’ (p. 111) – the only major disagreement being the Edinburgh
Whigs’ refusal to see the House of Commons as representing the nation (it repre-
sented, rather, ‘the people in contradistinction to the aristocracy’, p. 112). Selinger
wisely stops short of claiming influence from one group over the other: rather, he
treats the similarities as evidence that post-revolutionary French parliamentarism
was ‘continuous with 18th-century British thought’ (p. 105), or perhaps more
specifically in this case, with 18th-century Scottish historical and political thought.
Dugald Stewart is identified – again, quite rightly – as a key element in the trans-
mission of 18th-century British thought into the 19th century.
One can hardly blame Selinger for not delving deeper into the specific mecha-
nisms of this transmission – his purpose is not primarily genealogical. Yet the
argument raises interesting questions about the common intellectual roots
shared by the Coppet circle and the Edinburgh Whigs. Which strand(s) of
‘British thought’ was post-revolutionary parliamentarism continuous with?
Stewart’s account was clearly indebted to Hume and Smith, but also noticeably
distinct from that of his 18th-century Scottish colleagues, in its explicit critique of a
supposedly Montesquieuan account of a ‘balanced’ English constitution. Burke’s
positioning as a source for 19th-century ‘parliamentarian’ critiques of the French
Revolution is also intriguing: Stewart and most of the Scottish writers here iden-
tified as proponents of parliamentarism were also staunch critics of the Reflections,
as was Constant (at least in the 1790s). While Selinger highlights the anti-
democratic views of his cast of late 18th-century and early 19th-century propo-
nents of parliamentarism, it is not difficult to imagine how a reformist and French
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Revolution-sympathizing Whig such as John Millar (here a minor yet significant
character in Selinger’s extensive cast) would have attempted to reconcile the pri-
macy of Parliament with a democratic agenda – Millar’s Historical View did in
fact, as pointed out by Selinger (p. 123), foreshadow Constant’s rejection of an
active constitutional monarch.
Moving deeper into the 19th century, Selinger traces the legacy of Constant’s
constitutional theory in Britain, showing that most 19th-century British liberals
envisioned Queen Victoria’s role in terms of a ‘neutral’ monarch ensuring the
constitutional stability of Britain. Constant’s views, it is shown, were less consen-
sual in France, as Burke and Necker’s vision for a monarch involved in parliament
through patronage retained significant support, notably with the Doctrinaires.
A new antagonist for parliamentarism also emerged: no longer the French
Revolution and its failure to restrain the legislature, but rather the American
Constitution, whose central flaw, in the view of many mid-19th-century liberals,
was instead its failure to secure the supremacy of the legislature over the executive.
Selinger examines a wide array of authors concerned with the relative merits of
American constitutionalism and liberal parliamentarism, with Tocqueville logical-
ly singled out for his parallel accounts of American constitutional democracy and
European parliamentarism. Far from rejecting the path of parliamentarism,
Selinger convincingly argues, Tocqueville believed that the survival of liberty in
the historical and constitutional context of 1840s France required a parliamentary
regime that would strike a middle ground between Constant and the Doctrinaires,
with an active monarch devoid of ‘corrupt’ influence in parliament.
The book’s last chapter focuses on John Stuart Mill, here presented as a fol-
lower (whether consciously or not) of Constant’s vision for a monarch who should
reign but not govern, and ministers who should lead in Parliament without relying
on patronage. The chapter is one of the book’s most original and thought-
provoking – it is no small feat to produce a fresh interpretation of Mill, who
has long been one of the most-discussed thinkers in the canon of political thought.
The traditional emphasis on Mill’s credentials as a progressive and democrat,
Selinger argues, has obscured another facet of his thought, namely his defence
of the parliamentary framework developed in post-1688 Britain, in the form of
constitutional monarchy and parliamentary government. In the process, Selinger
avoids the trap of treating Mill as a sui generis writer, instead placing him in the
rich context of 19th-century British liberalism. He argues both for reading Mill
alongside other Victorian authors who subscribed to similar principles, and for
reinstating Victorian liberalism in the ‘historical consciousness’ of contemporary
political theory, as an important moment both in terms of substance (notably
because Victorian liberals formulated powerful critiques of the American
Constitution: their point that it ‘had never instituted effective legislative control
over the executive’ still resonates strongly), and in terms of historical reach and
influence (especially due to the adoption of British parliamentarism by postcolo-
nial states such as India). A number of fascinating insights emerge from this
re-assessment: for example, Walter Bagehot, while the most famous theorist of
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parliamentarism, is shown here to have been remarkably out of sync with many of
his Victorian contemporaries, as he believed parliamentary deliberation to be the
almost exclusive cause of the superiority of the British system, and de-emphasized
the relevance of individual liberty and political responsibility. Mill, although often
portrayed as the ultimate free thinker, was in fact more representative of the wider
intellectual context than Bagehot. Like Constant (whose disciple Adolphe Thiers
was cited by Mill as the first theorist of parliamentarism), Mill argued that the
House of Commons’ control over ministers led to a monarch uninvolved in gov-
erning, and analysed the crises of 19th-century French parliamentarism in terms of
France’s inability to institute a neutral constitutional monarch. By insisting (more
so than Tocqueville) that the French president should be appointed by the legis-
lature, he also reproduced de Sta€el’s account of a parliamentary republic. In this
account, Mill’s theory of parliamentary institutions was in the end more aligned
with that of the Coppet circle than with Tocqueville’s.
Mill did break with Constant on at least one crucial issue, however: he champ-
ioned a widely expanded suffrage, and hoped that parliamentarism could be rec-
onciled with democracy. As the book’s conclusion demonstrates, Mill’s hopes,
once realized, would reveal new challenges for parliamentarism. Bringing the nar-
rative into the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Selinger sketches out some of
these unintended effects. Mass democracy, it soon became evident, shifted the
focus of politics away from parliamentary deliberation and towards the contest
for plebiscitary leadership. ‘By the turn of the 20th century’, Selinger concludes:
it was increasingly established that democracy led not to an omnipotent legislature (as
Tocqueville and Mill had both thought) but rather to a powerful plebiscitary execu-
tive. The rise of mass democratic politics created new resources for the plebiscitary
executive that undermined its traditional dependence on parliament and made the
constitutional ideals examined in the book seem increasingly untenable. (p. 195)
Two writers who honed in on the tensions between parliamentarism and democ-
racy were Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, although they came to different conclu-
sions. While Weber continued to place his hopes in classical parliamentarism as the
best available model for a free state, Schmitt became convinced that parliamentar-
ism and democracy were fundamentally incompatible, and argued to reject parlia-
mentarism as a historically contingent phenomenon unduly dependent on
Enlightenment values. There is much to learn, Selinger suggests in a convincingly
pessimistic conclusion, about Schmitt’s analysis: Constant’s ‘neutral monarch’ is
no longer a plausible bulwark against the danger of usurpation by ambitious
political leaders, while the twin threats of popular usurpation and despotism
described by Montesquieu in the mid-18th century have never fully receded. It is
difficult to disagree with Selinger’s closing assessment that ‘we still have no good
substitute for representative assemblies when it comes to achieving the values of
responsibility, representation, and deliberation’ (p. 206). As demonstrated by this
important study, the political tradition that advocates parliamentarism as a
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bulwark of liberty does not hold all the answers: but the questions it raises are
more relevant than ever.
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